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FCC Regulation and Other Oxymorons:
Seven Axioms to Grind
By ERWIN G. KRASNOW*
HARRY F. COLE**
WILLIAM E. KENNARD***
Federal Communications Commission Chairman Mark S.
Fowler had the right animal in mind when he described the
FCC as "the last of the New Deal dinosaurs."' What he must
have visualized is a creature with a head too small for its body,
a body too big for its environment, and a tail that just goes on
and on.
Appropriately enough for such an outdated reptile, the Com-
mission traditionally has taken an antediluvian approach to
policy-making. It would be nice (and certainly charitable) to
characterize the FCC as a forward-thinking agency that ap-
proaches its role with foresight, and with its bureaucratic feet
fixed firmly on the ground of reality. But, alas, that is not the
case.
The FCC rarely takes advantage of the 20/20 hindsight avail-
able to it, and, as a result, often stumbles through a haze of
fuzzy thinking borne of its own past decisions. All too often
the Commission has let itself be guided by slogans which are
not only well worn, but worn out. But, despite the Commis-
sion's quaint, and, we submit, inappropriate approach to its
regulatory chores, it has not sent American society or the com-
munications industry tumbling back to the age of the vacuum
tube.2
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1. Fowler, Broadcast Unregulation in the 1980's, TELEVISION Q., Spring 1982, 7-9.
2. Many would argue, however, that had it not been for the FCC's antiquated ap-
proach to UHF television, FM radio and cable television, these services would have
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Today, however, telecommunications policy has reached a
crucial stage in its evolution, as "Star Wars" type technologies,
once thought fanciful, are becoming a reality. Futurists have
heralded this "technological explosion"3 as the dawn of a new
"Information Age" that will transform the nature of American
society.4 The government agency that must play a major role
in leading the country into its post-industrial future is (ready
or not) the Federal Communications Commission. On the
bright side, the Commission has a chance to foresake its past
mistakes and instead, step into the light of a new day.
We are not overly sanguine about the future. George
Santayana wrote of historical lessons, "Those who cannot re-
member the past are condemned to repeat it."' The danger of
historical lessons is that those who do study the past may sim-
ply find other ways to err. Nonetheless, and for whatever risk
it entails, we will review some of the regulatory axioms 6 which
guided the Commission in the past and which, in our view,
would best be relegated to the archives lest they gum up the
works any more than they already have:
Antediluvian Axiom 1: Government Always Knows Best: The
Cod Liver Oil Approach to Business Behavior
Antediluvian Axiom 2: Bigness Is Always Bad, Or, Less Is More
Antediluvian Axiom 3: Act Now, Think Later: Sleigh Before the
Reindeer Decision-Making
Antediluvian Axiom 4: The Best Way to Cut Red Tape Is
Lengthwise
Antediluvian Axiom 5: When In Doubt, Mumble
developed and prospered at a much earlier date. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY AND H.
TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, 35-43 (1982). Peter's Bureaucratic
Principle seems an apt description of FCC policy-making in this regard: "Bureaucracy
defends the status quo long past the time when the quo has lost its status." L. PETER,
PETER'S QUOTATIONS 83 (1977).
3. "Explosion" is the mod word to describe contemporary phenomena ....
Appropriately enough, one of the most prominent explosions is in communica-
tions about the communications explosion. One is tempted to define the com-
munications explosion as a proliferation of meetings, papers and speeches on
the theme "Gee whiz-ain't science terrific!" which produces an outward burst
of verbosity that spews verbal debris in all directions.
Loevinger, The Sociology of Bureaucracy, THE Bus. LAW., Nov. 1968, at 7.
4. See J. NAisBrrr, MEGATRENDS (1982); A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1981).
5. G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON (1906); J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
867 (1968).
6. "As any geometry student knows, there is no arguing about axioms. They are
given to be accepted." R. KHARASCH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE: HOW TO UNDER-
STAND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND OTHER BuLKY OBJECTS 13 (1973).
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Antediluvian Axiom 6: The Best Technical Standard Is No Tech-
nical Standard
Antediluvian Axiom 7: The Raised Eyebrow Is An Uplifting Regu-
latory Gambit
Antediluvian Axiom 1:
Government Always Knows Best: The Cod Liver Oil
Approach to Business Behavior
Born in 1934, in the midst of the New Deal, the FCC histori-
cally approached regulation as if it had a birthright flowing
from its New Deal heritage. The dominant theme of the New
Deal was that anything private business could do, government
could do better-or, when in doubt about a problem, procrasti-
nate, then regulate. Taylor Branch has divided New Deal agen-
cies into two categories: "deliver the mail" agencies and "Holy
Grail" agencies.7 "Deliver the mail" agencies perform neutral,
mechanistic tasks; they send out Social Security checks, pro-
cure supplies-or, at least in theory, deliver the mail. "Holy
Grail" agencies, on the other hand, are given the more contro-




versial and difficult role of achieving some grand moral or civi-
lizing goal. The Federal Radio Commission, precursor to the
FCC, came into being primarily to "deliver the mail"-to act as
a traffic cop of the airwaves in order to prevent harmful inter-
ference. But both the FRC and the FCC had a vague Holy
Grail clause written into their charters: the requirement that
they uphold the "public interest, convenience and necessity."
This classic catch-all phrase has enabled the FCC to be not
only the airwaves' traffic cop, but its vice and morals squad as
well.8
From inception, the FCC embarked on a zealous search for
the Holy Grail, and journeyed further than many of its sibling
agencies created in the 1930's. Undaunted by the tremendous
growth in the electronic media-growth which undercut many
bases for the regulation as perceived in 1934-the FCC charged
on, with its regulation of the broadcast industry hitting a high
water mark in the mid-to-late 1970's.
In the tradition of the Emperor with his new clothes, the
Commission apparently did not think it was regulating pro-
gramming content. After all, both the first amendment and
section 326 of the Communications Act9 would seem to discour-
age such regulation, a fact which even the Commission ac-
knowledged ... while it proceeded to regulate programming.
The FCC's quest for the Holy Grail in broadcasting in the
1970's was particularly substantial in the regulation of pro-
gramming content. It included such minutiae as the precise
8. A passage from the Supreme Court's majority opinion in National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), is perhaps the most frequently cited authority for
the expansive view of the FCC's regulatory mission:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet
we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act
does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts
upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic.
319 U.S. 215-16 (Murphy, J. and Roberts, J., dissenting). One commentator character-
ized the above quote as:
perhaps the most misinterpreted words in the judicial history of broadcasting
regulation .... Many readers of this part of the decision have taken this to
mean that the Court was approving FCC dictation of program content. In con-
text, however, these two sentences simply say that the Commission has the
authority to select licensees as well as to "supervise" them. 'Traffic" in the
Court's analogy refers to licensees, not to programs.
F. KAHN, DocuMENTs OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 125 (4th ed. 1983).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
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method broadcasters had to follow in consulting members of
their communities before formulating programming schedules,
and the minimum amounts of nonentertainment programming
a broadcaster had to air.' ° The Commission told broadcasters
how much time they could dedicate to commercials in any
given hour," and even decreed that certain commercials five
minutes or more in length were per se against the public
interest.12
The Commission has begun to retreat from this position. In
1981, it "deregulated" four aspects of the commercial radio in-
dustry by eliminating rules and policies concerning program
logs, commercial time limitations, ascertainment of community
problems, and nonentertainment programming require-
ments. 3 The Commission based its deregulation decision on
its finding that the radio industry is sufficiently competitive to
permit marketplace forces to exercise the regulatory role pre-
viously played by the government. In the words of Commis-
sioner Anne Jones, the Commission recognized that the time
had come "to stop treating broadcasters like little children."' 4
The Supreme Court agreed with this approach when, in 1981, it
recognized that the marketplace, albeit imperfect, often results
in greater diversity of program formats than can be achieved
by the pronouncements of the FCC.' 5 As Bernard Wunder, Jr.,
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications
and Information, observed:
[Ilt is not necessary for the competitive marketplace to work
perfectly in order to make it preferable to traditional kinds of
highly detailed, intrusive, and expensive regulation. All that
the marketplace has to do is work as effectively as regulation to
make it the preferred option. And, as former CAB Chairman
Alfred Kahn has repeatedly noted, "It's not hard to work 'as
10. In Re Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57
F.C.C.2d 418 (1976).
11. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.281 (1982).
12. In Re Public Notice Concerning the Applicability of Commission Policies on
Program Length Commercials, 44 F.C.C.2d 985 (1974).
13. In Re Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979), Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), affd in
part and remanded in part, Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, No. 80-1032, slip op. (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
14. Statement of Commissioner Jones at Meeting of the Federal Communications
Commission (Jan. 14, 1981) (audiotape of meeting available from FCC, Washington,
D.C.).
15. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
No. 4]
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effectively' as regulation."'1 6
One might conclude from all this that Antediluvian Axiom 1
is already vestigial. Not so. The Commission has not yet ex-
tended its radio deregulation decision to television licensees.
And even the "deregulated" radio industry is still subject to
many nitpicking rules and policies. For example, a broadcaster
who regularly offers live coverage of horse racing from a legal-
ized track places his license in jeopardy. 7 It is also contrary to
FCC policy for a radio station to announce that it is "present-
ing" a live performance by a musical artist or group unless the
licensee is sharing in the profits or losses of the appearance.' 8
Yet nothing in the FCC's requirements prohibits a station from
announcing that it is "welcoming" the musical artist. This Tal-
mudic exercise in semantics is certainly inconsistent with the
FCC's recent deregulatory zeal. There are other Alice-in-Won-
derland rules and policies on the books-rules and policies
which the FCC thus far has not seemed overly anxious to
repeal.19
This Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde approach to content regulation
might be benign were it not for many issues currently facing
the FCC, in part as a result of developing communications
technologies. The Commission may soon consider (or recon-
sider) the regulatory policies to govern teletext, direct broad-
cast satellites (DBS), and multipoint distribution services
(MDS). All of these services could be subject to content regu-
16. Broadcast Reform Proposals, 1981: Hearings on H.R. 4726, H.R. 4780, and H.R.
4781 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1981) (state-
ment of Bernard J. Wunder, Jr.).
17. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4125, 73.4176, 73.4130 (1982); In Re Broadcasting of Informa-
tion Concerning Horseracing, 41 F.C.C.2d 172 (1973); Declaratory Ruling, 32 F.C.C.2d
705 (1971). It should be noted, however, that the Commission has proposed eliminat-
ing this policy as part of a broader effort to prune what the Commission has identified
as "regulatory underbrush," defined as:
[TIhe accumulation of Commission policies, doctrines, declaratory rulingis],
rules, informal rulings and interpretive statements that have grown up around
major regulations over the years. These 'underbrush' matters . . . have the
potential to impede the competitive functioning of the marketplace by stifling
broadcasters' discretion in much the same manner in which small vines can
choke a healthy tree.
FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17631 (Aug. 5, 1983).
18. In Re Complaint Against Doubleday Broadcasting Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 763 (1975).
19. Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow once described the FCC as "a vast and
sometimes dark forest, where FCC hunters are often required to spend weeks of their
time shooting down mosquitos with elephant guns." N. MINOw, EQUAL TIME: THE PRI-
VATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 258-59 (1964).
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lation if the Commission's New Deal alter ego compels it to
reassert its old role as social engineer. At minimum, the long-
term impact of today's policy-making regarding these new
technologies should force a rethinking of the appropriateness
of content regulation in a telecommunications marketplace
vastly different from that of 1934.
Apart from questions presented by the developing technolo-
gies, the Commission may be given other opportunities to dic-
tate what we see and hear. For example, the FCC is being
pressured to decide the amount, content and type of children's
television programming. 20 Efforts are also underway to amend
the Communications Act to require broadcasters to offer spe-
cific percentages of nonentertainment programming.2' In sum,
Antediluvian Axiom 1 may remain alive at the FCC for quite
some time.
Antediluvian Axiom 2:
Bigness Is Always Bad, Or, Less Is More
In casting about for historical antecedents on which to model
its own regulatory work, the Commission has not restricted it-
self to the New Deal. One can find traces of such disparate in-
fluences as Puritanism, Benign Despotism, or other blasts from
the past. The trouble is that the FCC does not seem to be able
to figure out when enough is enough; when the old approach
really ought to be relegated to the history books. Take, for ex-
ample, its multiple ownership rules. (Or, as Henny Youngman
would say, "Take these rules, please.") The Commission, pla-
giarizing the nostrum of the old trust busters, concluded early
on that it would be best to minimize the number of media out-
lets any one individual or group could own. That was not a to-
tally off-the-wall idea fifty years ago when there were few
media outlets. Today, however, such scarcity does not exist in
most communities. Not only are multiple broadcast signals
available, but there are also cable television systems, some of
which have capacity to provide more than one hundred video
and/or audio channels, and an alphabet soup of newer services
(e.g., STV (subscription television), PPV (pay per view),
SMATV (satellite master antenna television), and MDS). An
estimated 28% of television households currently receive ten
20. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 82-2438 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
21. H.R. 2370, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H1808 (March 24, 1983).
No. 41
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or more television stations over the air and 80% receive five or
more signals.22 Not too far over the rainbow are DBS services,
low power television (LPTV), and multi-channel MDS sys-
tems. In other words, far from a drought in media channels,
there is now a decent reservoir, and in the near future there
may well be a flood.
The current restrictions on broadcast ownership are essen-
tially the same ones adopted in earlier times. VHF television
licensees are barred from acquiring cable systems or radio sta-
tions in their markets.23 No entity may own more than seven of
any kind of broadcast station,24 even though no similar restric-
tions apply to cable, DBS, LPTV, MDS or newspaper owner-
ship. Broadcasters cannot own two stations in the same
broadcast service with overlapping primary coverage areas,
25
even though cable operators may provide multiple channels of
programming to subscribers residing in an equivalent area.
The Commission's inconsistency comes of rules and policies
having their genesis at a time when broadcasting was, along
with newspapers, the only game in town. And because news-
papers were clearly outside the realm of government regula-
tion and broadcasting was viewed as inside, the conventional
wisdom being that broadcast frequencies were "scarce," it
made sense then to parcel out stations stingily. These factual
predicates belong to history now. Cable television has joined
the mass media ranks, swelling the number of available chan-
nels significantly. Indeed, it is ironic that daily newspapers,
which have never been subject to federal regulation, have de-
creased in number (only 36 cities have more than one daily
newspaper), while precisely the opposite has occurred in the
medium whose regulation was justified by the "scarcity ration-
ale. ' 26 As a result of these changes, the Commission must rec-
ognize that its overly restrictive ownership rules, which do not
22. J. Levy and F. Setzer, Measurement of Concentration in Home Video Markets
81 (Office of Plans and Policy, Dec. 23, 1982) (Available from FCC).
The 1982 Annual Report of the American Broadcasting Companies graphically de-
scribes the new video marketplace as "the increasingly leaky living room." The New
Dimension of Television: An ABC Essay 7.
23. 47 C.F.R. § 636 (1982).
24. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1982).
25. Id.
26. See e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
PARITY (Comm. Print 1983).
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make sense in today's marketplace of abundant media outlets,
will make even less sense in tomorrow's.
Antediluvian Axiom 3:
Act Now, Think Later: Sleigh Before the Reindeer
Decision-Making
Everybody likes to play Santa Claus, and the FCC is no ex-
ception. The trouble is that sometimes in its rush to hand out
treats to new competitors in the media marketplace, the FCC
does not stop to consider the consequences until it is too late,
when the intended benefits of its actions may have been lost or
gotten stuck on the roof. A classic case in point is low power
television (LPTV).
LPTV (or "Toy TV" as some FCC officials call it) was an idea
which gained momentum in the late 1970's. It is a new broad-
cast service consisting of low powered television stations in-
tended to serve narrowly circumscribed areas (i.e., within a
radius of 10-i5 miles). The allocation standards to be applied
to such a new service were designed so as not to interfere with
existing, full power television stations. The proceeding aimed
at developing those standards was instituted in 1980.27 But, in
its generous dash to hand out presents, the Commission left
the house without its pants and announced that it would au-
thorize "interim" LPTV operations pending adoption of final
allocation standards.28 In other words, the FCC invited people
to apply for facilities for which there were no technical stan-
dards, much less any appropriate application form. These fac-
tors did not discourage the thousands of applicants eager to
participate in this "gold rush" for television spectrum space.
Two aspects of this situation should be emphasized. First,
any time the FCC is confronted by thousands of applications
(and, at last count, the number was around 12,00029), the
agency's resources to deal with such masses of paper are over-
whelmed. As a result, mere organization of the LPTV applica-
tions became an institutional circus. More fundamental,
however, was the embarrassing problem of what the devil to do
27. Notice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket 78-253, 83 F.C.C.2d 449 (1980).
28. The Commission's decision to authorize interim operations, which occurred
immediately prior to the 1980 elections, prompted speculation that there may be a con-
nection between the two events.
29. See LPTV Complaints, BROADCASTING, March 21, 1983, at 60.
No. 4]
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with them once they had been sorted out and placed in neat
piles. There were, after all, no standards governing their tech-
nical acceptability. As a result, virtually all of the applications
are gathering dust in the files, despite the expectations of the
thousands of applicants--expectations which the FCC created
and graciously nurtured. Even after the Commission hastily
adopted some skeletal LPTV rules in 1982,30 applications were
processed at a glacial pace-a year after the rules were
adopted, only about 200 of the 12,000 or so applications had
been granted, and less than 50 of those stations were on the
air.3'
Did the Commission learn from its mistakes in the LPTV de-
bate? Obviously not.3 2 In 1982, it issued "interim" authoriza-
tions to a number of applicants for DBS licenses, although
fundamental questions about the new service were left (where
else?) dangling in space. The FCC's well intentioned present
was meant, of course, to give DBS applicants a headstart, so
that they could be prepared to offer the new service shortly af-
ter international satellite agreements are reached in the next
few years.
The DBS authorizations do not create the large complica-
tions of LPTV, simply because the number of applicants with
the alleged technological expertise and financial backing is
much more limited. Nonetheless, DBS service will displace ex-
isting terrestrial users of the 12 gHz band, and its authorization
has signalled a radical departure from the FCC's professed em-
phasis on "localism" in the licensing of broadcast services.
Neither of these questions has been resolved, and yet, the FCC
has given DBS applicants the "all systems are go" signal to
start spending the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to
30. See Report and Order in BC Docket 78-253, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982).
31. The following Bureaucratic Law provides an apt description of the FCC's
processing of interim LPTV applications:
Running a project in this office is like mating elephants-(A) it takes a great
deal of effort to get on top of things; (B) the whole affair is always accompa-
nied by a great deal of noise and confusion, the culmination of which is her-
alded by loud trumpets; (C) after which, nothing comes of the effort for two
years.
P. DICKSON, THE OFFICIAL RULES 22 (1978).
32. In another context, former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson warned the
FCC to learn from its mistakes: "One does not have to drop an egg on a hard floor a
dozen times to learn that it will break. With a modest knowledge of eggs and hard
floors even a single drop seems superfluous." In re Prime Time Access Rule, 50
F.C.C.2d 829, 892 (1975) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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blast DBS off the ground.33
However commendable the Commission's giving spirit might
be, it should recognize that interim authorizations are often
undertaken at great private and public expense. Interim au-
thorizations may be appropriate in exceptional situations in
which failure to expedite the authorization could foreclose fu-
ture options for Commission action. Unless such foreclosure
can be demonstrated, however, the Commission should be ex-
tremely reluctant to take the "interim" route. In most in-
stances, that route leads to frustration and needless expense
on the part of all concerned, regardless of the fact that the "in-
terim" route may be paved with good intentions.34
Antediluvian Axiom 4:
The Best Way to Cut Red Tape Is Lengthwise
At the end of the last decade, the Commission won two
prizes in the paperwork (or perhaps more aptly, papermill)
field--one from the General Accounting Office, for the agency
requiring the largest number of worker hours to fill out its
forms and comply with its rules; the other from the Small Busi-
ness Administration, for the agency with the largest number of
forms and applications. 5
To its credit, the Commission has made serious, and largely
33. Commissioner Anne Jones appropriately described this type of interim author-
ization as "the 'pits'-a preliminary, interim, temporary system." In an FCC meeting
on the authorization of DBS, Jones queried:
Having authorized the construction of what could be several hundred million
dollars worth of satellites, and having promised an exciting new TV medium,
would the Commission then have the courage to determine that a 'permanent'
DBS system was not in the public interest and hence relegate several hundred
million dollars worth of newly authorized hardware to the scrapheap?
Pungent Observations Have Been Jones Hallmark, Communications Daily, April 11,
1983, at 6.
34. This axiom was stated, perhaps most eloquently, by James H. Boren, president
of the International Association of Professional Bureaucrats (bureaucratically abbre-
viated INATAPROBU). The Boren Principle of Error Implementation states:
Errors implemented by inaction are less dangerous than errors implemented
by action. Errors by inaction have less impact and more mushistic graduality
than errors of action. Graduality provides time for adjustment and of accom-
modation, and permits institutional homeostatis to take place. The degree of
graduality is the Mush Factor of Error Implementation.
J. BOREN, HAVE YOUR WAY wrrIH BUREAUCRATS: THE LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO PYRAMIDING
FEATHERHEADS AND OTHER STRANGE BIRDS 21 (1975).
35. One wag has observed: "Pornography to a bureaucrat is a blank sheet of pa-




successful, efforts to cut back on unnecessary paperwork re-
quirements, possibly spurred by the unfavorable publicity aris-
ing from the GAO and SBA findings, and the enactment in 1980
of the Paperwork Reduction Act.3 6 In the 1980's, the Commis-
sion shortened the broadcast renewal forms to the size of a
postcard, eliminated its annual broadcast financial reporting
requirement, relaxed filing requirements for ownership infor-
mation, and threw out its program logging rules for commercial
radio licensees. It has also shortened its application require-
ments for new broadcast station construction permits and for
assignments of licenses and transfers of control.37 Other possi-
ble areas of paperwork reform include elimination of require-
ments for television and noncommercial radio stations. 8
Antediluvian Axiom 5:
When In Doubt, Mumble
James H. Boren, author of The Bureaucratic Zoo, The Search
for the Ultimate Mumble, summarized the technique of many
government bureaucrats: "When in charge, ponder; when in
trouble, delegate; when in doubt, mumble. ' 39 The FCC is a
master of the bureaucratic mumble. This mastery is best illus-
trated in the area of comparative renewal policy. That policy
governs the Commission's resolution of proceedings in which a
new applicant files an application to oust a renewal applicant
and take over the use of the frequency. Resolving such pro-
ceedings entails the classic task of comparing apples (i.e., the
incumbent's performance as a licensee) and oranges (i.e., the
challenger's promises of what its own performance will be).4°
36. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (1980).
37. During fiscal years 1981 and 1982, the FCC reduced by nearly 65 percent the
paperwork burden it places on those regulated by the agency. COUNCIL OF INDEPEND-
ENT REGULATORY AGENCIES, REGULATION RELIEF AS THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES, 19 (1982). The FCC was the single most effective agency in the federal gov-
ernment in eliminating unnecessary paperwork in 1981. Id. (Of course it did have
more pieces of paper to eliminate.)
38. The Commission's decision to reduce substantially the broadcast renewal form
was upheld recently in Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, Nos. 81-1710 & 81-2277,
slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1983). A reversal of the Commission's decision would have under-
mined the FCC's momentum to reduce paperwork requirements in other areas.
39. Boren points out that a mumble can never be quoted. He acknowledges, how-
ever, that all mumblers are not bureaucrats-some are members of Congress or the
House of Commons. J. BOREN, supra note 35, at 127.




In September, 1973, then-Chairman Dean Burch made the fol-
lowing admission against interest before the International Ra-
dio and Television Society:
If I were to pose the question, what are the FCC's renewal poli-
cies and what are the controlling guidelines, everyone in this
room would be on equal footing. You couldn't tell me, and I
couldn't tell you-and no one else at the Commission could do
any better, least of all the long-suffering renewals staff.
The same statement could be made today. Indeed, the situa-
tion has become more complicated. Aware of its shortcomings
in this area, the Commission recently instituted a rule-making
proceeding intended to make sense out of the whole compara-
tive renewal conundrum.4'
That, unfortunately, is not all the FCC has done. Pending
resolution of that rule-making, the Commission has gone for-
ward with comparative renewal proceedings already on file. In
so doing, it has had at least one occasion to set some rather
inconsistent standards. In the case of a classical music FM sta-
tion in Gloucester, Massachusetts, licensed to a self-reliant old
fellow named Simon Geller, the Commission concluded that a
lack of locally-oriented nonentertainment programming under-
mined the "renewal expectancy" that the incumbent licensee
might otherwise enjoy.42 This result does not appear inher-
ently unreasonable in light of the Commission's historical con-
cern about locally-oriented nonentertainment programming. It
does not become absurd until it is noted (as attentive readers
of Axioms 1 and 4 will recall) that prior to the Gloucester deci-
sion, the Commission eliminated rigid percentage guidelines
a riddle within an enigma within a conundrum. The riddle: by what standards
is a renewal applicant to be measured. The enigma: by what standards is a
renewal challenger to be measured. The ultimate conundrum of course is,
even assuming the establishment of such respective standards, how can there
be constructed a matrix which can be used to rationally measure and compare
two largely unrelatable properties: an empirical property (an existing record)
and an a priori property (a set of applicant pledges).
Broadcasting Renewal Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 433 (1977) (Separate Statement of
Commissioners Hooks and Fogarty).
41. See Notice of Inquiry in BC Docket 81-742, adopted Oct. 22, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg.
55,279 (1981); Further Notice of Inquiry in BC Docket 81-742, adopted Sept. 29, 1982, 47
Fed. Reg. 46,117 (1982).
Perhaps the "Optimum Optimorum Principle" is applicable here: 'There comes a
time when one must stop suggesting and evaluating new solutions, and get on with the
job of analyzing and finally implementing one pretty good solution." DICKSON, supra
note 31, at 138.
42. Simon Geller, 91 F.C.C.2d 1253 (1982), appeal pending.
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for minimum amounts of nonentertainment programming (or,
as the cognoscenti call it, "magic minimums") which must be
broadcast by commercial radio broadcasters, and it has also
eliminated program logging requirements for such licensees.
Moreover, it has eliminated the questions on the renewal form
calling for an analysis of nonentertainment programming per-
formance. The net result: while the FCC will apparently (at
least for the time being) attach substantial, if not conclusive
importance to a renewal applicant's broadcast of nonentertain-
ment programming, it has eliminated the method (i.e., appro-
priately designed renewal forms) for reviewing such
performance, and it has also eliminated the method (i.e., pro-
gram logs) by which commercial radio licensees were required
to document their performance. 43
Now the apparent inconsistency of all this might very well be
attributed to deregulatory growing, or rather, shrinking,
pains." But, in the meantime, the Simon Geller decision sheds
about as much light on the Commission's comparative renewal
policy as (to borrow a useful metaphor from the FCC's Review
Board) "a damp matchstick at RFK Stadium with all the field
lights on-at high noon. '45 The Commission appears to be giv-
ing to broadcasters with one hand and taking away with the
other. While the Commission plays Santa with some, Simon
Geller got coal in his stocking.
Antediluvian Axiom 6
The Best Technical Standard Is No Technical Standard
If you stand at one end of a crowded chicken coop and make
a loud noise, all the chickens will look up simultaneously and,
after an instant's "thought," run around, usually smashing
themselves into walls. The same thing occurs if you stand in
the corridors of the FCC and shout "Marketplace Forces!" The
43. Note, however, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
cently directed the Commission to modify its radio deregulation decision to require
radio licensees to maintain some method of recordkeeping to enable the Commission
and the public to monitor a licensee's compliance with the Commission's programming
requirements. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No.
81-1032, slip. op. (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
44. And in any event, one should not lose sight of Emerson's observation that
"consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds ... ." Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841), J.
BARTLETr, FAmriAR QUOTATIONS 501b (1955).




current Commission is so infatuated with the idealized, concept
of marketplace regulation-a concept quite appropriate in
many areas of its concern-that it is often blind to the sensible
limitations of that concept. So it goes with infatuation. 46
As indicated in Antediluvian Axiom 1, there is a respectable
body of thought and law which indicates that some traditional
areas of FCC regulation should yield to marketplace regula-
tion. Program content regulation is a glaring case in point. On
the other hand, some areas are not susceptible to the dynamic
pull of buyer and seller. In particular are bedrock technical
matters. This is because the primary function the FCC was
organized to perform is to ensure the overall technical excel-
lence of the nation's broadcast services-to be a spectral "traf-
fic cop" as it were. Regardless of the program content to be
transmitted, the technical quality of those services was in-
tended to be maximized.47
The Commission probably does not disagree with this propo-
sition. It has evinced a willingness, however, to bow out of any
significant role in the technical area in some instances, prefer-
ring to leave the setting of technical standards to marketplace
forces. This is akin to turning off all the traffic lights in the
midst of rush hour.
In the case of AM stereo, the FCC was confronted with five
different stereo systems, none of them immediately compati-
ble. Rather than establish specific standards, run exhaustive
tests, and ultimately endorse one of the systems (or a compos-
ite system) as technically superior, the Commission an-
nounced some loose standards, concluded that all five systems
met those standards, and washed its hands of the ultimate
choice.48 Instead, the FCC let the marketplace decide.
There are serious difficulties with this misplaced reliance on
the market. Simply stated, the factors which may influence the
46. Mark Fowler's "commitment to the marketplace has become so much apart of
the Washington folklore that former Commissioner Robert E. Lee, raconteur ex-
traordinaire, has worked a reference to it into his repertoire: "'The first time I laid
eyes on him,' Lee says, 'I wondered who the young man with the mellifluous voice was,
so I asked him his name. He said, 'Let the marketplace decide.'" Mark S. Fowler: The
Name Spells Marketplace, BROADCASTING, April 5, 1983, at 175.
47. This is the "Deliver the Mail" function, as opposed to the "Holy Grail" function.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48. "Success in a bureaucracy depends not so much on whom you please, but on
whom you avoid making angry. Corollary: To succeed, concentrate not on doing great
things, but on the avoidance of making mistakes." 'Transiles Law of Bureaucratic Suc-
cess," from DICKSON, supra note 31, at 212.
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public's decision to buy one technical system over another
(i.e., marketing, packaging, etc.) do not necessarily bear any
relation to the technical efficiency of the service. Further, even
though the invisible hand of the marketplace might ultimately
select a single system, the inefficiencies of the marketplace se-
lection process guarantee that no such choice will emerge for
years. All five proponents of the AM stereo systems will wage
lengthy, costly battles to establish a foothold in the market-
place. But system manufacturers will be reluctant to commit
themselves to the mass production of AM stereo units until
they are able to ascertain which system will prevail in the mar-
ketplace. Few broadcasters are interested in buying a system
for which there may never be any receivers available. To com-
plicate matters, the antitrust laws prohibit broadcasters from
deciding the issue themselves.
The resulting chicken and egg dilemma ultimately delays the
introduction of new broadcast services. Thus, while the Com-
mission continues to regulate in areas where it does not belong
and where a marketplace approach is proper, it has defaulted
on its legitimate "traffic cop" function. When it comes to polic-
ing the spectrum, the FCC is "copping out."
Instead of learning from the past, the Commission engaged
in "instant replay" and abandoned to the marketplace its duty
to set technical standards for teletext. In the near future the
Commission will consider whether to set technical standards
for TV stereo. Ideally, the Commission will avoid reliance on
Antediluvian Axiom 6 in approaching this and other threshold
decisions concerning new communications technologies. If it
does not, it may consign promising new services to the same
fate as AM stereo and teletext.
Antediluvian Axiom 7
The Raised Eyebrow Is An Uplifting Regulatory Gambit
Dan Greenberg, in his classic work, How to Be a Jewish
Mother, A Very Lovely Training Manual, observed that under-
lying all techniques of Jewish motherhood is the ability to
plant, cultivate and harvest guilt. "Control guilt," he said, "and
you control the child."49 The lifted eyebrow approach to regu-




lation is the FCC's way of planting, cultivating and harvesting
guilt and controlling the behavior of broadcasters.
Judge David Bazelon noted that while the main threat to
broadcasters is that the government can put a licensee out of
business, "the more pervasive threat lies in the sub rosa bu-
reaucratic hassling which the Commission can impose on the
licensee, i.e., responding to FCC inquiries, forcing expensive
consultation with counsel, immense record-keeping and the
various attendant inconveniences."5 He observed that "licen-
see political or artistic expression is particularly vulnerable to
the 'raised eyebrow' of the FCC; faced with the threat of eco-
nomic injury, the licensee will choose in many cases to avoid
controversial speech in order to forestall that injury."'5 1 There
are many examples of this process-ranging in the past from
anxiety-producing speeches of FCC Chairmen at the annual
conventions of the National Association of Broadcasters 52 to
the application processing guidelines which enable the FCC to
control TV programming.
And what can you say about an agency that tried to ban "Puff
the Magic Dragon"? That was done by an FCC Public Notice
reminding broadcasters of their duty to exercise responsible
judgment with regard to airing records "tending to promote or
glorify the use of illegal drugs.53 This reminder was coupled
50. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
51. Id.
52. Newton Minow's characterization of television as a "vast wasteland" shocked a
convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in May, 1961, shortly after he
became chairman of the FCC. Minow challenged broadcast executives to sit down in
front of their television sets for a full day, assuring them that they would observe a
"vast wasteland" of game shows, violence, formula comedies, sadism, commercials,
and boredom. See Minow Observes 'a Vast Wasteland', BROADCASTNG, May 15, 1961, at
58-59.
53. Records, Review by Broadcast Licensees, 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971); Yale Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 414 U.S. 914 (1973). Commis-
sioner Nicholas Johnson dissented, criticizing the Commission's action as an
unconstitutional and "Kafkaesque" attempt "by a group of establishmentarians to de-
termine what youth can say and hear." Id. at 412.
[I]f the Commission majority is really interested in doing something about
the drug problems in this country, and is not just striking out at the youth
culture, why does it ignore songs like. . .'This Night":
Lady I'm looking for a jukebox
A bar stool that fits my bottom side
These streets are too dark for walking
I'm in no condition to ride
This midnight rider lost his saddle
And I'm in, no mood, for thinking
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with Congressional testimony by the Chairman of the FCC
that he would vote to take away the license of a station playing
drug-oriented music.
In a similar incident, the FCC announced in 1973 an inquiry
to determine whether certain radio call-in programs-so-called
"topless radio" shows-were obscene, indecent or profane.
The next day FCC Chairman Dean Burch, speaking before the
annual convention of the National Association of Broadcasters,
attacked, in very strong terms, the "prurient trash that is the
stock-in-trade of the sex-oriented radio talk show, complete
with the suggestive, coaxing, pear-shaped tones of the smut-
hustling host."54 These cases illustrate how easily the FCC
can-by mastering the subtleties of Jewish motherhood-cen-
sor broadcast programming without regulation.
The Supreme Court's 1978 decision concerning the use of
"indecent" language-the so-called "Seven Dirty Words"
case-enhances the Commission's capacity to instill fear and
loathing, since the Court held that the FCC had substantial
discretion to review broadcasters' programming.
The Fowler Commission, it has been said, has been ex-
tremely circumspect in fluttering its regulatory eyebrows.56
That may be attributable, in part, to the fact that budgetary
and staffing cutbacks have forced the Commission to focus its
I need some liquid consolation
This night ain't fit for nothing but drinking.
T.T. Hall, "This Night (Ain't Fit for Nothing But Drinking)" (© 1970, Newkeys,
Inc.) Song Hits, November 1970, at 41.
Id. at 413, 413 n.5.
54. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 515 F.2d at 408.
55. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975) rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Justice Brennan, dissenting, found the decision "dangerous
as well as lamentable .... It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the
Court to approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words they
contain." Id. at 775.
56. In an address to broadcasters, Fowler observed that "the FCC has no business
trying to influence by raised eyebrow or by raised voice for that matter. I confess that
there was a romance bordering on chivalry when a chairman might declare television
to be a vast wasteland. Those kind of pronouncements, as I see my job, are not mine to
make. You are not my flock, and I am not your shepherd." The Public's Interest, Ad-
dress by Mark Fowler to the International Radio and Television Society (Sept. 23,
1981) (FCC News Release No. 3541, at 9). See also Mayer, FCC Chief's Fears, Fowler
Sees Threat in Regulation, Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1983 at K6, col. 4. ("Television 'is
just another appliance-it's a toaster with pictures,' [said FCC Chairman Mark Fowl-




limited resources in other areas.5 7 Nevertheless, the power to
arch an administrative eyebrow will continue to exist as long
as the agency retains the power of life and death-i.e., the au-
thority to issue licenses, and the power to revoke them-and as
long as the agency asserts broad discretion relative to how and
when it chooses to exercise its power.
In view of the above, we have formulated seven modern axi-
oms to guide the FCC as the electronic media enters a new,
and uncharted, era:
Modern Axiom 1: Trust the True Marketplace; Anything the Pri-
vate Sector Can Do, the Government Can Do Worse
Modern Axiom 2: Bigness Is In the Eyes of the Beholder: Less
is Frequently Less
Modern Axiom 3: Think Now, Act Later: Placing the Horse
Before the Cart Makes for a Smoother Ride
Modern Axiom 4: Suppress the Urge to Wrap Something Up
with Paper and Tie It with Red Tape
Modern Axiom 5: When in Doubt, Eschew Interim Authoriza-
tions and Complete the Rule-Making
Modern Axiom 6: Failure to Adopt Technical Standards Is Tan-
tamount to a Double Standard
Modern Axiom 7: Concentrate on Being a Traffic Cop and Get
Rid of the Vice and Morals Squad
57. See Wicker's Law: "Government expands to absorb revenue-and then some."
DICKSON, supra note 31 at 185.
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